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CPLR 5226 available to obtain installment payments where income
execution precluded by federal law.
In Erenerol v. McCarthy 23 9 plaintiff, a judgment creditor,
moved pursuant to 5226 to order a judgment debtor to satisfy
the judgment by making weekly installment payments. The fact
that the defendant was a seaman created a problem since Section
601 of Title 46 of the U. S. Code was applicable to him. The
section provides that "no wages due . . . to any seaman . . .
shall be subject to attachment .. .from any court. . ," 240
The court, in granting the plaintiff's motion, stated that the
wages cannot be attached or, by analogy, reached by an income
execution under CPLR 5231 before the seaman obtains possession
of them. However, it continued, the wages may be reached after
they are out of the employer's hands. There is ample authority for
this proposition.
The New York Court of Appeals had previously held that,
although the wages of a federal employee are not subject to garnishment, once the wage is paid the state may apply a portion of
this income toward the payment of his debts. 241 In addition,
Section 793 of the Civil Practice Act, the predecessor of Section
5226 of the CPLR, was a vehicle used to reach income that could
not be reached by execution. As a specific
example of this use,
2 42
wages of a federal employee are cited
In summary, it seems well established that section 5226 ma'
be used to avoid the bar of federal statutes which prevent the
garnishment of federal wages. It is merely a matter of getting a
5226 order, operative against the judgment debtor after wage
payments are received, rather than using the income execution
of 5231.
There is an irony here. The courts have indicated that the
reason why the installment payment order circumvents the federal
prohibition is that it reaches the wages after they are in the hands
of the employee. The fact is, however, that the income execution
itself, under CPLR 5231, runs directly against the judgment
debtor. It should therefore be available against the wages because
it is actually seeking them only after they are in the judgment
debtor's own hands, the very factor upon which use of the
installment payment order of 5226 has been justified. The courts
may be called upon to resolve this question. It could not arise
under prior law because there, under CPA § 684, the income
execution was served only upon the employer, and hence would
239 20 App. Div. 2d 798, 248 N.Y.S.2d 464 (2d Dep't 1964).
24038 Stat. 1169 (1915), 46 U.S.C. §601 (1958).
241 Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 80, 8 N.E.2d 283, 285 (1937).
242 Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E.2d 283 (1937); Bowes v.
Perkins, 169 Misc. 624, 8 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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be seeking to reach wages not yet paid. It was, for that reason,
found barred by federal prohibition. Shall the income execution
still be so barred, though it seeks wages in the hands of the
judgment debtor himself, rather than in the hands of the employer?
Priorities in judgment debtor's personalty where section 5234 is
inapplicable.
In re Goldberg 243 was a proceeding to determine the priorities
among several creditors in an award the judgment debtor had
received in the court of claims. The amount of the award had
been deposited in a bank by the state comptroller and was to be
paid out pursuant to the direction of the supreme court. The
State of New York and the City of New York both claimed a
priority in the fund as against various judgment creditors on the
ground that the sovereign had a common-law priority for taxes
which had become due prior to the service of subpoenas by the
other judgment creditors. Faden Paper Corp. and H. Wool &
Sons, judgment creditors, argued that they were entitled to priority
244
in the award because they had served third-party subpoenas
245
and restraining orders
upon the comptroller prior to service
by any of the other creditors.
Justice Koreman, relying on well-established case law,2' 6
held that the state and city were entitled to the common-law
priority of a sovereign. With respect to the private judgment
creditors, Faden Paper Corp. and H. Wool & Sons, the court
held them entitled to priority as against other judgment creditors,
since they had served their third-party subpoenas prior to the
other judgment creditors.
The priorities as among judgment creditors found in CPLR
5234 were inapplicable in the instant case. That section only
applies when an execution is delivered to the sheriff or when orders
under article 52 are filed.2 4 7 Since there is no provision in the
CPLR to cover the situation presented in the instant case,
the court had to rely on common-law principles to establish
priorities. The court adopted a "first in time" approach, in that
the judgment creditor who first served his subpoena was given
priority over a private judgment creditor who subsequently served
a subpoena. Such a method rewards the diligent creditor. One
may argue, however, that since the CPLR does not provide for
Misc. 2d 1037, 252 N.Y.S2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
CPLR 5224.

24343
24
245 CPLR
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E.g.,

5222.

Matter of Brown Printing Co., 285 N.Y. 47, 32 N.E.2d 787 (1941);

Matter of Atlas Television Co., 273 N.Y. 51, 6 N.E2d 94 (1936); City of
New York v. Leibowitz, 5 Misc. 2d 1033, 138 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct 1955).
247See
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